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INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, was injured in an elevator at
185 South State Street when the elevator malfunctioned. Defendant
Kimball Elevator Company ("Kimball") manufactured, installed and
maintained the elevator.

Defendants the Boyer Company, 185 South

State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership, H. Roger
Boyer, Kern C. Gardner and 185 South State Owners7 Association (the
"Boyer defendants") owned or managed the building, including the
elevators.

The trial court granted Kimball's and the Boyer

defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied Ms. Kleinert's
motion for leave to amend her complaint to allege res ipsa
loquitur.

This appeal challenges those rulings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendants are correct in stating that a trial court's
grant of summary judgment is reviewed under a correction of error
standard.

But because

summary

judgment denies a party the

opportunity to present its case on the merits, in deciding whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues
of material fact, this court must review the facts and inferences
from those facts in the light most favorable to the losing party
(Ms. Kleinert) and overturn the summary judgment if a genuine issue
of material fact exists.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737

P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).

In determining whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists, the court must construe any doubts or
uncertainties concerning the facts in favor of Ms. Kleinert.

- 1-

Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).

REPLY TO DEFENDANTS7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendants have overstated the deposition testimony they
rely on for their statements of the case.
For example, the Boyer defendants state that Lee Peterson, the
property manager of the building's common areas, was not aware
before Ms. Kleinert's accident of any problems with the elevators
dropping or rising rapidly, was not aware that an elevator even
could operate in the manner Ms. Kleinert described and had noticed
only "minor, generic problems common to all elevators" before the
accident.

See Brief of Appellees at 3.

Although Mr. Peterson

testified that he had never heard any rumors before March 1987 that
the elevators at 185 South State had a tendency to drop or rise
rapidly, other types of problems with the elevators had been
reported to him.

See R. at 395 f 5.

He had notice of elevators

breaking down, not working, stopping and catching people inside.
He testified that he had received complaints about elevators not
responding to calls or going to the wrong floor.

Id. at 396 f 7.

He further testified that the elevators at 185 South State caused
him special concern because they had "a higher incidence of
elevator malfunctions" than the elevators at other properties he
had managed.
heard

See id. at 401 f 19. Moreover, although he had not

of an elevator operating

in the manner the plaintiff

described, Mr. Peterson did not purport to be an elevator expert.
- 2 -

He did not remember specifically studying elevator operation or
maintenance in his training as a property manager.
education was in business finance.

His formal

Id. at 395-96 f 6.

The defendants state that Kenneth L. Fuller, the elevator
technician responsible for servicing the elevators at 185 South
State, testified that the elevators were equipped with numerous
safety devices and that it would be "impossible" for the elevators
to operate in the manner Ms. Kleinert described.

In fact, Mr.

Fuller merely testified that the elevators had electrical and
mechanical

override switches that were supposed to stop the

elevators if they went a certain percentage over their rated
running speed but would not necessarily stop the elevators from
moving erratically and stopping abruptly, as Ms. Kleinert claimed
the elevator did. See id. at 328-30. Mr. Fuller further testified
that he did not know at what speed the override switches were set
and that they could be altered. Id. Finally, Mr. Fuller testified
that it was "highly unlikely" for the elevators to operate in the
manner Ms. Kleinert described and that it was "[iImpossible to my
knowledge,"

not

defendants claim.

that

it

was

physically

impossible,

as

the

See id. at 289 & 331.

The defendants claim that Ross A. Harrison serviced the
elevators at 185 South State for approximately two years and that
he had never heard of an elevator operating in the manner Ms.
Kleinert described.

In fact, Mr. Harrison had only serviced the

elevators for a year to a year and one-half and testified that he
had not heard of the elevators in that building (not any elevator)
- 3 -

operating in the manner Ms. Kleinert described.
M

See id. at 396-97

11 & 12.
Ted Bambrough testified, as the defendants state, that he had

never heard of an elevator operating in the manner the plaintiff
described.

However, Mr. Bambrough also testified, among other

things, that he could "document several cases" where people had
started an elevator bouncing and "trip[ped] it electrically,"
causing it to go up and down, id. at 127 & 333, and that Kimball
had had a "common problem" with the elevators at 185 South State in
that someone "kept opening the return panels on all the cars . . .
[to get] into the workings of the buttons and the computer and all
that stuff," id. at 335. Mr. Bambrough also testified that he was
not

familiar with

functioned.

the way the

elevators at 185 South State

See id. at 397 f 13.

Finally, the defendants cite the testimony of Brent J. Russon,
Kimball's manager. Mr. Russon testified that he was familiar with
the elevators in question, but his familiarity with the elevators
consisted merely of handling the paperwork for their servicing and
of having "been in the building several times."

See id. at 397

f 15. Mr. Russon claimed that it was impossible for an elevator to
drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described by the
plaintiff. However, Mr. Russon also testified that his experience
in the elevator industry had been primarily in management positions
and that he had never serviced an elevator.

The only training he

had ever received regarding the way an elevator functions was some
introductory

courses

covering

only

- 4 -

"very

basic

levels

of

electricity, general safety, material handling and this type of
general training.11

id. at 337-38.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE ELEVATOR
WAS DEFECTIVE.
Kimball

claims, and

the

trial

court

agreed,

that

the

plaintiff's product liability claim failed as a matter of law
because the plaintiff could not prove a defect in the elevator.
The plaintiff agrees that she has the burden of proving at
trial that the elevator was in a defective condition that made in
unreasonably dangerous to the user.

See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.

Armco Steel Co. , 601 P.2d 152, 156, 158 (Utah 1979). See also Utah
Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) (1992).

Kimball argues that there is a

presumption under section 78-15-6 that the elevator in this case
was not defective.

The plaintiff agrees that, if the statute

applies, the presumption also applies.1

1

However, the statutory

There is a serious question as to whether the statute even
applies. Although the statute was originally enacted before the
plaintiff's accident, it was later declared unconstitutional. See
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985).
Because an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio, it is as if
it had never been passed.
See, e.g.f Nevada Power Co. v.
Metropolitan Dev. Co.. 765 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Nev. 1988). Thus,
when the plaintiff's claim arose, there was no valid statute in
effect.
Although the statute was later reenacted without its
unconstitutional provision, Utah statutes are not retroactive
"unless expressly so declared," Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986), and
section 78-15-6 does not say it is retroactive. The court need not
decide the applicability of the statute, however, because the
result in this case is the same whether the statute applies or not.
- 5 -

presumption is "rebuttable."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3).

A

rebuttable presumption does not take an issue away from the jury
unless

there

is

no

contrary

evidence.

The

effect

of

the

presumption is to place on the plaintiff the burden of going
forward with evidence of a product defect (a burden she had whether
or not the statute applies).

If the plaintiff produces any

evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably find that
the elevator was defective, the presumption disappears, and the
plaintiff is entitled to have the jury consider her claim.

See

Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. , 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d
764, 769 (1952).
Ms. Kleinert's testimony about how the elevator acted in this
case, see R. at 342-52, raised a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the elevator was defective, sufficient to get to a jury.
A jury could reasonably infer from her testimony that the elevator
was in a defective condition (that is, one not contemplated by the
user) that made it unreasonably dangerous to the user.

Elevators

simply do not act as the elevator in this case did unless they are
somehow defective.
Kimball

argues, however, and the trial court apparently

agreed, that the plaintiff's testimony was not competent evidence
of a product defect, that a plaintiff must have expert testimony of
a product defect before she can get to a jury.
Neither the statute nor the case law requires a plaintiff to
prove a product defect by expert testimony.

- 6 -

The statute is silent

as to how a plaintiff must prove a defect, so unless the cases
require expert testimony, the trial court erred in requiring it.
Under Utah law, expert testimony is not required if "the
matter is one which is within the knowledge of the average trier of
fact."

Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc.r 740

P. 2d 284, 289 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).

"If the

jury is capable of understanding the primary facts of the case and
drawing correct conclusions from them, no expert testimony is
required." Id. A jury would certainly be capable of understanding
Ms. Kleinert's description of events, and it does not take an
expert to conclude that, if the elevator actually acted as the
plaintiff claims it acted, it must have been defective.

The

average lay person knows that elevators are not supposed to act
like a "human Martini mixer," to use Kimball's colorful phrase.
Expert testimony is only necessary if the issue is "one which
requires special knowledge not held by the trier of fact."

Id.

Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), the only case Kimball has cited in which expert testimony
was required, was just such a case.

The issues in that case were

whether a drug manufactured by the defendant caused the plaintiff's
injuries and whether the doctor who prescribed the drug breached
the applicable standard of care. The court required expert medical
testimony to establish causation2 and breach of the applicable
standard of care because "these matters are outside the knowledge

2

Kimball's motion did not challenge the plaintiff's claim
that her elevator ride caused her injuries.
- 7 -

and experience of laypeople.11

See 764 P. 2d at 640.

By contrast,

whether or not an elevator is in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user is peculiarly within the knowledge of
laypeople, the average users of elevators.

Significantly, the

court in Reeves did not say that the plaintiff had to have expert
testimony to prove that the product was defective if it in fact
caused the plaintiff's injuries. In that case, a jury could infer
a defect.
None

of

the

testimony either.

other

cases Kimball

cites

requires

expert

In neither Ernest W. Hahnf Inc. v. Armco Steel

Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), nor Dowland v. Lyman Products
for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982), was the competency or
sufficiency of the evidence of product defect an issue. See Hahn,
601 P.2d at 155; Dowland, 642 P.2d at 380, 381.
there

was

conflicting

expert

testimony

as

In both cases,
to

whether

the

defendant's product was defective. In one case, the jury concluded
that the product was defective, see Hahn, 601 P.2d at 158, and in
the other case the jury concluded that it was not, see Dowland, 642
P.2d at 382. The fact that a jury may choose to disbelieve expert
testimony does not mean that expert testimony is always required.
The only relevance Hahn and Dowland have to this case is to show
that the question of product defect is for the jury to determine
where there is conflicting evidence.
McCarty v. F.C. Kingston Co. f 522 P.2d 778 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974), did not hold, as Kimball claims, that expert testimony was
required to show the precise engineering defect that caused the
- 8 -

plaintiff's injury.

It simply held that the trial court did not

commit reversible error when it instructed the jury that the
plaintiff could not recover if it found that the plaintiff's
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 522 P.2d
at 779-80.

Although the plaintiff called an expert who testified

that there was a defect in the defendant's product, id. at 779,
apparently the jury did not believe the expert's testimony.
Kimball also misrepresents the holding in Power v. Otis
Elevator Co.. 409 So.2d 389 (La. Ct. App. 1982).

The plaintiff in

that case fell down an escalator. Her evidence at trial consisted
of her own testimony and that of two eyewitnesses.
390.

409 So.2d at

The jury heard all the evidence and concluded that the

escalator did not malfunction.

The court emphasized that it was

for the jury to weigh the evidence and refused to invade "the fact
finding function of the jury."

Id. at 391.

The only case Kimball has cited in which a court upheld the
dismissal of a products liability claim is M&R Investment Co. v.
Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729 (Nev. 1989).

M&R did not hold that expert

testimony of a product defect was required.

Rather, the court

found

defect

insufficient

evidence

of

a

product

where

the

"uncontradicted testimony of [the plaintiff's] own expert witness
established that the elevator was properly designed, manufactured
and installed." 773 P. 2d at 731. In this case, on the other hand,
the plaintiff's evidence unequivocally shows that the elevator
malfunctioned, from which one could infer a product defect.

- 9 -

The clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions rejects
Kimball's argument that expert testimony of a product defect is
always required.
testimony

that

In fact, a number of cases have confirmed that
a product

malfunctioned

or

that

an accident

involving the product occurred is sufficient to get to a jury on
the issue of product defect.

See, e.g.. Knight v. Otis Elevator

Co.. 596 F.2d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 1979) (proof of a specific defect is
not required to get to a jury in an elevator case; a malfunction
itself is sufficient to make the existence of a defect a jury
question in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary
causes) (applying Pennsylvania law); Ruiz v. Otis Elevatorf 703
P.2d 1247, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (elevator malfunction is
sufficient evidence of defect to get to a jury); Van Zee v. Bayview
Hardware Store, 74 Cal. Rptr. 21, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (a
plaintiff need only establish that he was injured while using the
product as it was intended to be used; a jury can find liability
without expert testimony); Cassisi v. Maytag Co.f 396 So.2d 1140,
1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (a legal inference of defectiveness
sufficient to establish a prima facie case for the jury arises when
a

product

malfunctions

during

normal

operation)

(citations

omitted); Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co.. 265 N.E.2d 212, 217 (111.
App. Ct. 1970) (evidence that product failed to perform in the
manner reasonably to be expected is sufficient to make a prima
facie case); Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So.2d 810, 813-14 (La.
1979) (a defect sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff
could be inferred

from the mere fact of an accident on an
- 10 -

escalator); Caldwell v. Fox. 231 N.W.2d

46, 51

(Mich. 1975)

(driver's testimony that brakes failed was sufficient evidence of
a defect in the brake system to raise a jury question).

If more

were required, "the supposed benefit of the theory of strict
liability would be lost to the . . . public."

Bradenburaer v.

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.. Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 275 (Mont. 1973).
In short, a jury could infer from the plaintiff's testimony
about how the elevator in this case acted that the elevator was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The jury
may choose to disbelieve Ms. Kleinert's testimony, or it may decide
not to draw an inference of product defect from that testimony.
But it is for the jury to decide what conclusions are most
reasonable given all the facts and circumstances; it was not for
the trial court to weigh the conflicting evidence on a motion for
summary judgment.
II.
THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER THE BOYER DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF
THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OF THE ELEVATOR.
There was also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the Boyer defendants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known of the dangerous condition of the elevator at
185 South State, precluding summary judgment in favor of the Boyer
defendants.
The undisputed facts showed that the elevators at 185 South
State were continually breaking down and that people had been stuck
in the elevators numerous times before Ms. Kleinert was trapped.
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See R. at 400 f 17.
about

the

dangerous

Kleinert's accident.3

The defendants claim that no one complained
condition

of

the

elevators

before Ms.

In fact, there were numerous complaints

about problems with the elevators.

See R. at 400 f 17.

Ms.

Kleinert herself had been stuck in the elevators three or four
times before the accident on April 16, 1984, and had reported the
problems through proper channels.

See id. at 399 ff 10-11.

The

property manager for the Boyer Company testified that he had notice
of the elevators breaking down, not working, stopping and catching
people inside and not responding to calls or going to the wrong
floor.

See id. at 396 f 7.

He further testified that the

elevators in the building caused him special concern because they
had

"a higher

incidence

of

elevator

malfunctions" than the

elevators in other properties he managed.

See id. at 401 f 19.

Moreover, there had been a "common problem" with people getting
into the workings of the elevators and bypassing the switches. Id.
at 335; see also id. at 397 f 13 & 401 f 18. The condition of the
elevators was a common joke among the building tenants. See id. at
400 ff 13-15. Ms. Kleinert's employer testified, for example, that
he had heard talk around the office that the elevators were not
working properly, that the lights would not come on and that the
elevators would not stop at a floor.
3

Id. at 443-44; see also id.

The defendants also claim that there were no reports of
similar incidents after the accident.
In fact, after the
plaintiff's accident, two other persons experienced a similar
problem with one of the elevators at 185 South State. They claimed
that the elevator fell approximately three floors, reaching a high
rate of speed, then stopped abruptly, throwing them against the
side railing and floor. See R. at 401 f 20.
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at 400 f 16. At a minimum, the evidence raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the defendants had notice that the
elevators were in a dangerous condition and hence were negligent.
Cf. Jacobi v. Builders" Realty Co., 164 P. 394, 395 (Cal. 1917)
(where an elevator was frequently out of order, it was negligence
for the owner not to have adequately warned and protected tenants
against the dangers attendant upon its use in its defective
condition).
The Boyer defendants do not dispute any of these facts.
Rather, the gist of their argument appears to be that they could
not be liable because they did not have prior notice that the
elevator had ever acted in precisely the way Ms. Kleinert claimed
it acted.

However, the fact that no one had previously known the

elevator in this case to act precisely as Ms. Kleinert claims it
acted "does not conclude the issue." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d
723, 728 (Utah 1985).

"The mere fact that a particular kind of

accident has not happened before does not . . . show that such
accident is one which might not reasonably have been anticipated."
Id. (quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen. , Inc. , 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975),
which in turn was quoting Ridley v. Grifall Trucking Co., 289 P.2d
31, 34 (Cal. 1955)).4
4

Similarly, the fact that weekly inspections of the
elevators did not disclose the defect does not conclude the matter.
Other courts have held that proof that an elevator was in good
condition at some time before and some time after the accident is
not conclusive of its condition at the time of the accident and
does not justify taking the issue of negligence away from the jury.
See, e.g. , Haag v. Harris, 48 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1935); Gallachicco v.
State, 43 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (Ct. CI. 1943).
Cf. McGowan v.
Devonshire Hall Apts., 420 A.2d 514, 518-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
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Other courts have

found that problems with

an elevator

generally may be sufficient to put a property owner on notice of a
dangerous

condition.5

For

example,

in

Conerly v.

Liptzen,

199 N.W.2d 833 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972), the court held that the trial
judge had properly refused to take a similar case from the jury
where

there

was

evidence

that

the

elevator

was

constantly

malfunctioning, putting the defendant on notice of dangerous
irregularities, despite the fact that the defendant had offered
unrebutted testimony that the elevator could not have fallen, as
the plaintiff claimed it did.

199 N.W.2d at 835-37.

See also

Strong v. Henra Realty Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (App. Div.
1982) (where there was evidence that the owner had actual notice
that an elevator was not functioning properly, it could be charged
with negligence); Cramer v. Merqard. 11 N.E.2d 108, 109-10 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1937) (where the defendant had notice of other occasions
in which the elevator door had opened when the elevator was not at
the floor and such an occurrence would have been impossible if the
elevator was in proper working condition, the defendant could be
liable); Sweeney v. Levy, 67 Pa. D. & C. 5, 7 (1948) (an elevator
that is allowed to become defective in any of its essential

(where maintenance had not uncovered a defect, there was an
inference that the landlord had not provided for sufficiently
thorough or frequent inspections and had thereby breached its duty
to keep common areas over which it reserved control in a reasonably
safe condition).
5

This is especially true if Utah were to follow the
majority rule that the owner of an elevator owes a higher degree of
care to its passengers. See, e.g. , Koenig v. 399 Corp. . 240 N.E.2d
164, 168 (111. App. Ct. 1968).
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operating parts is a dangerous instrumentality, and injury to a
person lawfully using the elevator can be reasonably foreseeable).
Moreover, even if the defendants may not have known the
elevator in this case to act precisely as the plaintiff claimed it
did, they were on notice of many of the problems the plaintiff
complained of.

They knew or should have known of lights in the

elevators going out.

See R. at 443-44, 400 J 14.

They knew or

should have known that the elevators had a tendency to drop floors
and not stop at a floor.

See id. at 443-44, 461 & 400 f 16. And

they knew or should have known that people were frequently stuck in
the elevators.

See id. at 396 f 7, 399 ffl 10-11, 400 ff 13 & 17.

From this evidence, taken as a whole, one could reasonably conclude
that the defendants had notice that one of their elevators might
malfunction, injuring the plaintiff.

Cf. Johns v. Otis Elevator

Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988) (evidence of substantially
similar incidents 18 months before was sufficient for the jury to
infer notice).
Brown v. Crescent Stores, Inc., 776 P.2d 705 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989), the only elevator case the Boyer defendants rely on, is
distinguishable from this case.
ninety-year-old

woman

defendant's building.

who

was

The plaintiff in that case was a
attending

a

luncheon

in

the

As she entered an elevator after the

luncheon, the elevator door allegedly shot out at her, knocking her
down. The court recognized that the building owner, as an elevator
operator, was "a common carrier owing a duty of the highest care
for its passengers' safety compatible with the practical operation
- 15 -

of its business." 776 P.2d at 707 (citations omitted).

The court

concluded, however, that the defendant could not be liable for
negligence

absent

"evidence

inherently

establishing

that the

occurrence was of an unusual and extraordinary character."

Id.

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Wilcoxen v. Seattle, 203 P. 2d 658
(Wash. 1949), which in turn was quoting Keller v. Seattle, 94 P.2d
184 (Wash. 1939)).

The evidence showed that there was no device

that could prevent an elevator door from coming into contact with
passengers and that some contact with elevator doors "was within
the ordinary incident of travel." Id. By contrast, the occurrence
in this case was "of an unusual and extraordinary character."
People do not expect to be trapped inside elevators and taken on a
forty-minute terror ride in the dark.
More important, the court in Brown held that evidence that the
defendant owner had received reports of prior accidents involving
elderly passengers in its elevators raised a question as to whether
the owner should have reasonably anticipated an accident and taken
precautionary measures.

Id. at 709.

Similarly, the undisputed

facts in this case show that the defendants had notice of prior
problems with the elevators, raising a genuine issue of material
fact

as

to

whether

the

defendants

should

have

reasonably

anticipated an accident and taken precautionary measures to protect
Ms. Kleinert.
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III.
WHETHER THE ACCIDENT COULD HAVE HAPPENED IS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT,
Both

Kimball

Kleinert's

and

claims

must

the

Boyer

fail

defendants

because

the

claim

that

Ms.

of

the

testimony

defendants' experts shows that it was physically impossible for the
elevator to act as Ms. Kleinert claimed it did.
have

overstated

the

evidence.

Two

of

the

The defendants

defendants'

five

"experts" were not experts in the area of elevator maintenance and
repair, and a third was not familiar with the elevators in the
building at 185 South State.
remaining

witnesses

See supra. pages 2-5.

testified

that

they

had

not

Although the
heard

of

an

elevator (or, at least, an elevator in the building at 185 South
State) operating in the way Ms. Kleinert described, they did not
say that it was physically impossible for an elevator to act that
way.6

Even if they had, that would not conclude the matter.

"As

the defendant's evidence approaches complete demonstration that the
event could not possibly have occurred, it is all the more clearly
contradicted

by the

fact that

it has occurred."

6

Restatement

Indeed, the sheer number of reported cases in which
elevators acted as the elevator in this case did show that such
occurrences are not impossible but can reasonably be anticipated.
See, e.g. , Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.
1964); Ferguson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 408 So.2d 659 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition denied, 418 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1982);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Street. 327 So.2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Chapman v. Turnbull Elevatorf Inc., 158 S.E.2d 438 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1967); Koenia v. 399 Corp.. 240 N.E.2d 164 (111. App. Ct.
1968); American Elevator Co. v. Briscoef 572 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1977);
Mas v. Two Bridges Assocs., 554 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1990); Weedon v.
Armor Elevator Co. f 468 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App. Div. 1983); Mallor v.
Wolk Properties. Inc.P 311 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Bond v.
Otis Elevator Co. r 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965).
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(Second) of Torts § 328D comment n (1963 & 1964)•

The defendants'

testimony merely raises a credibility question, which it was
improper for the court to resolve on summary judgment. See Reeves P
764 P. 2d at 639.

Courts have repeatedly held that it is for the

jury to decide whether a given occurrence was impossible, as the
defendant's experts claim, or whether it actually happened, as the
plaintiff claims.

See, e.g.r Conerly v. Liptzen. 199 N.W.2d 833,

835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apts.. 420
A.2d 514, 517-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.
The Boyer defendants argue that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a second
amended complaint because the plaintiff had already amended her
complaint once, the motion to file a second amended complaint was
sought late in the course of litigation, the plaintiff was aware of
the facts underlying her proposed second amended complaint from the
beginning of this lawsuit and the plaintiff has failed to give any
adequate explanation for her failure to allege res ipsa loquitur
earlier.
The fact that the plaintiff had already amended her complaint
once does not mean she could not amend a second time. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend its pleadings by
leave of court whenever "justice so requires."

There is no limit

on the number of times a party may amend a pleading. Rather, rule
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15 "is to be liberally construed so as to further the interests of
justice."

Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d

245, 248 (Utah 1983).

Trials on the merits are favored, and amendment of pleadings will
generally be permitted unless there has been undue delay, bad faith
or undue prejudice. See Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
There is no evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in
seeking leave to amend her complaint, and in fact the plaintiff had
a reasonable explanation for not seeking leave to amend earlier.
Although the plaintiff was aware of the facts underlying her
proposed second amended complaint in 1988, when she filed her first
complaint,

two

events

occurred

in

1990

that

prompted

the

plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. First, the
plaintiff received a report from her expert witness that failed to
pinpoint the defect in the elevator that caused the accident,
making it impossible for her to rely on proof of a specific defect
at trial, as she had anticipated doing. See R. at 273-74. Second,
the Utah Supreme Court decided Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center. 791 P.2d

193

(Utah 1990), which held that a

plaintiff could rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
expert testimony and that multiple defendants could be held liable
under that doctrine, thus removing the two biggest obstacles to the
plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur claim.
In arguing that Ms. Kleinert's motion for leave to amend was
untimely,

the

defendants

rely

heavily

- 19 -

on

cases

from

other

jurisdictions.

Of course, those cases are not controlling.

"The

rule in this state has always been to allow amendments freely where
justice requires, and especially is this true before trial."
Gillman v. Hansen. 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d
(footnote omitted).

1045, 1046 (1971)

In all the Utah cases the defendants have

cited in which the court upheld a trial court's denial of a motion
to amend, the motion was brought shortly before a scheduled trial
date.

See Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah

1983) (amendment "would certainly have delayed the trial"); Girard,
660 P.2d

at 248 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of trial);

Regional Sales AgencyP Inc. v. Reichertf 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (motion made the day before trial), vacated, 830
P.2d 252 (Utah 1992); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light Co., 746 P.2d
1189, 1190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (motion made about two and onehalf weeks before trial).

By contrast, in this case no trial date

had been set when the plaintiff filed her motion, and discovery was
still ongoing.
generally

allowed

Under these circumstances, Utah courts have
amendments

to

the

pleadings.

See, e.g.,

Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d
187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973); Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046, 1047;
Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 35-38, 148 P. 452 (1915).
The mere fact that a motion to amend comes late in the case
does not alone justify denying leave to amend.

Hageman v. Signal

L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973).

The critical

factors are whether the parties have had adequate notice to meet
new issues and whether there would be substantial prejudice to the
- 20 -

opposing party if the motion were granted. Id.; Ringwood. 786 P.2d
at 1359-60.

Prejudice is "the inconvenience and delay suffered

when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into
the litigation."

Romo v. Reyes, 548 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1976).
The defendants did not meet their burden below of showing that
they would be prejudiced if the plaintiff were allowed to amend.
The defendants had notice of the plaintiff's claims from the
beginning of this action.

The plaintiff's Complaint and Amended

Complaint both alleged that the building owner was negligent in
that it breached its duty to the plaintiff.

The doctrine of res

ipsa loquitur is simply an evidentiary doctrine to aid plaintiffs
in proving negligence.

Roylance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah

Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

It is a

procedural doctrine, not a substantive rule of law, that carries
the plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit by allowing the jury to
draw an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence.
Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196; Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah
1980).

Since res ipsa loquitur is simply a rule of evidence to

support a negligence claim and the plaintiff had already made a
negligence claim against the Boyer defendants, they could not have
been prejudiced by the proposed amendment, which simply spelled out
the plaintiff's intention to rely on the evidentiary doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur at trial.

"Having notice of the 'transaction'

described in the pleadings already on file, [the defendants] had
notice

of

the

legal

issues

which
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could

be

raised

by

that

transaction."
1982).

Owen v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Ariz.

The plaintiff's proposed amendment would have done no more

than allow the plaintiff
justified

by

the

facts

"to obtain whatever legal relief was
already

established

admissible at trial on the original issues."

by

discovery

and

Id. at 282. In fact,

the plaintiff might have been entitled to a res ipsa loquitur
instruction

at

trial

if

the

evidence

had

supported

instruction, even if she had not pled res ipsa loquitur.

such

an

See Loos

v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, 258-59
(1940).
In short, the plaintiff's proposed amendment sought only to
add

allegations to support

a negligence

claim, which she had

already made, against the same parties and regarding the same
occurrence as those set out in her initial and amended complaints.
All that was added was a new legal theory that would have allowed
the plaintiff to obtain an instruction allowing the jury to infer
negligence.

It is hard

to see how the amendment would

necessitated

any

delay

defendants.

The only additional

undue

or

otherwise

prejudiced

have
the

issue raised by the proposed

amendment was whether the plaintiff could establish an evidentiary
foundation for res ipsa loquitur.

The burden was on the plaintiff

to do so. The defendants would not have had to take any additional
discovery, and any additional discovery they chose to take would
have been minimal.

Under these circumstances, the trial court

abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a
second amended complaint.

Cf. Owenf 649 P.2d at 282-83 (it was an
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abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend to add a claim for
punitive damages based on allegations of one defendant's vicarious
liability for the alleged gross negligence of the other defendant
where a negligence claim against the other defendant was already
before the court).
Kimball argues that the trial court properly denied Ms.
Kleinert leave to amend because she had not established that the
occurrence was more likely than not caused by negligence. Kimball
has confused the plaintiff's evidentiary burden at trial with her
burden on a motion for leave to amend.

The plaintiff agrees that

before she can present a res ipsa loquitur claim to a jury she must
establish an evidentiary foundation for that claim.

However, the

only substantive issue on the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend
was whether

the

allegations

complaint stated a claim.7

of

her

proposed

second

amended

The plaintiff alleged that she entered

an elevator, the doors closed, the lights went out, and for the
next forty minutes she was thrown about the elevator as it
repeatedly rose and fell, abruptly stopping each time. She further
alleged that the elevator was under the exclusive management and
control of the defendants and that she was free from any fault.
See R.

at

248, 250.

One could

7

reasonably

infer

from the

Kimball's opposition to that motion raised only the legal
issue of whether a plaintiff who claims strict products liability
can rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish the existence of a
product defect. R. at 285-86. Ms. Kleinert did not seek to use
res ipsa loquitur to prove her strict products liability claim.
Rather, her res ipsa loquitur claim was an alternative to her
strict products liability claim. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
specifically allows a plaintiff to plead claims in the alternative.
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plaintiff's allegations that the accident was more likely than not
caused by someone's negligence.

Indeed, the plaintiff's expert

would have so testified. See R. at 300 J 4. Thus, the plaintiff's
allegations stated a claim based on res ipsa loquitur*

Whether or

not she could prove that claim at trial was not an issue below.
The trial court therefore erred in denying her the opportunity to
prove her claim.
The case Kimball relies on support the plaintiff's claim. In
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196
(Utah 1990), the plaintiff went into an operation without a burn on
her leg and came out with a burn on her leg.

As Kimball

acknowledges, the circumstances suggested negligence, regardless of
any expert testimony.

Similarly, in this case, the plaintiff went

into an elevator without any injuries and came out with injuries.
These circumstances also suggest negligence, even without expert
testimony.
Kimball also relies on the dissent in Sanone v. J.C. Penney
Co. . 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248 (1965).

That is because the

majority held that the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured on
the defendant's escalator was sufficient to get to a jury under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

The only difference between that

case and this is that Sanone involved an escalator whereas this
case involves an elevator.

Unable to distinguish Sanone, Kimball

asks this court to disregard it.

Sanone, however, is the law of

Utah, and, given that decision and the facts of this case, the
plaintiff should have been allowed to plead res ipsa loquitur.
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Kimball claims that Sanone makes the owner of an escalator the
insurer of a passenger's safety even where there is no showing of
negligence or product defect.

Sanone and the other cases the

plaintiff has relied on do not make the manufacturer or owner of an
elevator an insurer of their passengers' safety. They merely allow
the trier of fact to infer negligence or product defect from all of
the facts and circumstances in the case.

The jury is always free

to find no negligence or defect, and, in fact, many do.

That is

not grounds, however, for taking the case away from the jury, as
the trial court in this case did.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial
court's

orders

granting

the

defendants' motions

for summary

judgment and denying the plaintiff leave to file a second amended
complaint.
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